"Eine der wichtigsten Errungenschaften der EU ist ohne Zweifel der freie Personenverkehr. Wie frei dieser in Zukunft sein wird, ist allerdings die Frage.

Ende August gab Innenministerin Johanna Mikl-Leitner ihre Absicht bekannt, die Grenzen künftig mit computergesteuerten Kameras zu überwachen. Als Beispiel dient ein ähnliches System an den holländischen Grenzen. Laut Robert Strondl, Abteilungsleiter in der Generaldirektion für öffentliche Sicherheit, soll es demnächst eine Erkundungsmission in die Niederlande geben. „Es ist nicht die Absicht, das System eins zu eins zu übernehmen, sondern wir wollen uns die ‚Goodies' rausholen."

Proteste aus Deutschland

@migo boras heißt das System, das seit einem Jahr die wichtigsten niederländischen Grenzübergänge bewacht. Ein Computerprogramm in der Kamera registriert Kennzeichen, Typus und Passagiere der Fahrzeuge. Wenn es eine Übereinstimmung mit Polizeidaten gibt, wird das Auto angehalten. Nicht nur wegen seines Namens ruft das System Erinnerungen an Orwells Big Brother wach. Ist es Zufall, dass Big Brother auch der Name eines der erfolgreichsten niederländischen Fernsehformate ist? Wie es jetzt aussieht, dürfte @migo boras ein ähnlicher Exportschlager werden, denn auch in Großbritannien und den USA wird die Technologie inzwischen verwendet.

Unumstritten ist das Ganze allerdings nicht. Als die niederländische Regierung ihre Pläne bekannt machte, gab es massive Proteste von deutschen Datenschützern und Politikern, die meinten, dass es gegen das Schengener Abkommen verstoßen würde. Und aus diesem Grund wurde das System in einer abgeschwächten Form eingeführt. So dürfen die Kameras maximal 90 Stunden pro Monat und nicht mehr als sechs Stunden pro Tag eingeschaltet sein. (...)

Nur dumme Verbrecher

Ähnlich sieht es Vincent Böhre von der niederländischen Organisation Privacy First, die sich für den Schutz der Privatsphäre einsetzt. Gegenüber Public meint Böhre, dass nur „dumme Verbrecher" erwischt werden. „Die organisierte Kriminalität passt sich an. Die nehmen Schleichwege oder fahren statt mit rumänischen Kleinbussen mit französischen oder mit deutschen BMWs." Möglicherweise ist das System sogar kontraproduktiv: „Die Gefahr besteht, dass sich die Polizei zu sehr auf die Technik verlässt und viel Zeit verliert mit der Anhaltung von unbescholtenen Bürgern." Den Erfolg bei der Bekämpfung von illegaler Immigration sieht Böhre im Promillebereich: „Das wirft die Frage auf nach der Verhältnismäßigkeit eines Systems, das an die 20 Millionen Euro gekostet hat."

Noch bedenklicher findet er, dass juristische Grundsätze umgekehrt werden: „Früher war es so, dass die Polizei ein Auto nur anhielt, wenn es einen begründeten Verdacht auf ein Verbrechen gab. Bei @migo boras wird automatisch jedes Fahrzeug registriert und mit der Datenbank verglichen." Das Ganze erinnere laut Böhre an eine „militärische Operation". „Eines der größten Probleme des Systems ist aber, dass es keine gesetzliche Grundlage gibt, obwohl das eigentlich der Fall sein sollte bei einer Beschränkung der Privatsphäre."

Eines müssen die Kritiker aber zugeben: Zu einem großen öffentlichen Aufschrei hat @migo boras bisher nicht geführt. Abgesehen von einigen kritischen Zeitungs- und Fernsehberichten konnte die Regierung es quasi durch die Hintertür einführen. Wie bei den traditionellen holländischen Fenstern mit offenen Vorhängen, durch die jeder gleich ins Wohnzimmer blicken kann, haben die Niederländer anscheinend wenige Probleme damit, dass der Staat durch ihr Autofenster schaut. Ohne Zweifel spielt dabei eine Rolle, dass Ereignisse wie die Morde an Pim Fortuyn und dem Filmemacher Theo van Gogh das Gefühl von Sicherheit nachhaltig zerstört haben.

Keine bösartigen Regierungen

Der Journalist Bart de Koning, Autor des Buches „Alles onder controle" („Alles unter Kontrolle"), sieht aber auch tiefere Gründe: „Themen wie Bürgerrechte bekommen hier sehr wenig Aufmerksamkeit. Im Grunde genommen sind die Holländer da ziemlich naiv. Wenn man ihnen sagt, dass es um die Sicherheit geht, nehmen sie leicht eine Beschränkung der Privatsphäre in Kauf." Zu einem Teil würde dies mit der Geschichte zusammenhängen: „Während die Deutschen ihre Erfahrungen mit der Nazizeit und der Stasi gemacht haben, können sich die Holländer noch immer schwer vorstellen, dass der Staat auch bösartig sein kann." (...)

Ein Amigo an jeder Laterne

In dieser Hinsicht können sich die holländischen Datenschützer auf etwas gefasst machen. Vor kurzem kündigte Innenminister Ivo Opstelten seine Pläne an, nicht nur an den Grenzen, sondern an allen Autobahnen die Kennzeichen automatisch registrieren zu lassen und die Daten vier Wochen lang zu speichern. Für Bas Filippini, den Gründer von Privacy First, ist @migo boras nur der Anfang einer unheilvollen Entwicklung: „Ich lebe gerne in einer freien Umgebung und suche selbst meine Freunde aus ... Bald hängt aber an jeder Laterne ein Amigo, der registriert, was wir machen.""

Source: Public (magazine for Austrian municipalities), November 2013, pp. 36-37. Click HERE to read the full article online on the Public website.

"A coalition of lawyers, journalists and internet freedom activists launched legal action against the Dutch government, in an attempt to get it to stop using information about Dutch people gleaned from NSA surveillance.

After it recently emerged that information about 1.8 million Dutch people's calls had been purloined by the National Security Agency, the country's home affairs minister, Ronald Plasterk, expressed annoyance that the U.S. agency hadn't asked first. However, he said, the monitoring "only concerns metadata, like who called who."

Dutch lawyers and journalists aren't so quite so sanguine about the matter, largely because their professions require confidentiality – something you can't guarantee clients and sources when you're potentially being monitored. On Wednesday, the Dutch Association of Defense Counsels and the Dutch Association of Journalists joined a broad coalition in suing Plasterk and the country's government, demanding that the state stop using data recorded in the Netherlands by the NSA.

The coalition also includes internet freedom activist Rop Gonggrijp, security expert Jeroen van Beek, advocate Bart Nooitgedagt, investigative journalist Brenno de Winter and tech law expert Mathieu Paapst, as well as the Internet Society Netherlands Chapter and Privacy First Foundation.

At the heart of the complaint is a potential legal sleight-of-hand that many (including me) have long suspected is in play – namely that intelligence agencies are bypassing their own countries' privacy laws by getting allies to spy on their citizens for them.
(...)
Daphne van der Kroft, public policy advisor at the coalition's law firm, Bureau Brandeis (yes, named after the legendary American jurist), suggested Plasterk and the Dutch state were "whitewashing" data.
(...)
This is not the first such case to arise in Europe following Edward Snowden's NSA revelations. The activist group Privacy International has attempted to sue the British government over data-sharing between the NSA and its UK counterpart, GCHQ. However, it had to approach a secret court to do this, and it got no response.

It is now trying a different angle, complaining to the OECD about the collaboration of telecommunications firms with the NSA. A separate group, Privacy not Prism, has skipped the secret court bit and gone straight to the European Court of Human Rights. (...)"

Source: http://gigaom.com/2013/11/06/dutch-lawyers-and-journalists-sue-government-over-nsa-links/, 6 November 2013.

"Gestern hat ein Bündnis aus niederländischen Aktivisten und NGOs Klage gegen ihren Innenminister Ronald Plasterk eingereicht – darunter unter anderem der Journalist Brenno de Winter, der Hacker und ehemalige Wikileaks-Mitarbeiter Rop Gonggrijp der niederländische Strafverteidiger- und Journalistenverband, die Privacy First Foundation und der niederländische Zweig des ISOC. Das Bündnis nennt sich selbst “The Dutch against Plasterk” und kritisiert vor allem die scheinheilige öffentliche Verurteilung der NSA-Spionagetätigkeiten, während im Hintergrund Geheimdienstinformationen ausgetauscht werden.
(...)
Die Kläger werden durch die Anwaltskanzlei bureau Brandeis vertreten, die erst im August diesen Jahres gegründet wurde und die sich besonders mit der juristischen Vertretung von gesellschaftlich relevanten Fällen aus den Bereichen Copyright, Datenschutz und Medienrecht befasst. Einer der Gründer, Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm, wurde als Verteidiger der File-Sharing-Anwendung KaZaA bekannt."

Source: http://netzpolitik.org/2013/niederlaender-verklagen-ihre-regierung-wegen-nsa-kooperation/, 7 November 2013. 

"A coalition of Dutch citizens and organizations initiated legal proceedings against the Dutch State, represented by Minister of Interior Affairs Ronald Plasterk on Wednesday, demanding Dutch intelligent services to stop using NSA data.The subpoena was filed by a coalition of citizens and organizations, among which the Dutch Association of Defense Counsels, the Dutch Association of Journalists, the Internet Society Netherlands Chapter and Privacy First Foundation.

They question the legality of the exchange of data between the Dutch intelligence service (AIVD) and the United States National Security Agency (NSA), and demand that the Dutch State stops using data that has not been obtained in accordance with Dutch law.

Last week Minister Plasterk confirmed the monitoring of mail and phone traffic in the Netherlands by the NSA. He also acknowledged that the Dutch Intelligence Agency had supplied information to the NSA and vice versa, but condemned the interception of phone calls and mails without permission.

"Plasterk has indeed condemned the NSA eavesdropping and spying without permission, but at the same time he is exchanging data with the NSA," told lawyer Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm, who represents the coalition of citizens and organizations, to Xinhua. "So based on the exchange of information regime the AIVD will eventually get the illegally obtained data."

"By using data that has been illegally acquired through the NSA, these data are sort of laundered by Plasterk and his secret services," Alberdingk Thijm added. "This case should put an end to that unlawful conduct. Our goal is that the Netherlands will act according to Dutch law. We cannot do much on what the Americans are doing here, but we can ensure that the Netherlands complies with the law. Furthermore we want citizens to be informed when their data was illegally obtained and used."

Alberdingk Thijm thinks their case could be followed in other European countries. "We based our case on European jurisdiction, so the case could simply be copied in other countries. However, they should sue their own state," he said.

Minister Plasterk was informed by the subpoena on Wednesday and he will, according to the administrative rules, have to appear in court on November 27. After that he will have six weeks, until January 8, to file a response."

Source: http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=178503, 7 November 2013.

"A coalition of defense lawyers, privacy advocates, and journalists has sued the Dutch government over its collaboration and exchange of data with the U.S. National Security Agency and other foreign intelligence services.

The coalition is seeking a court order to stop Dutch intelligence services AIVD and MIVD from using data received from foreign agencies like the NSA that was not obtained in accordance with European and Dutch law. It also wants the government to inform Dutch citizens whose data was obtained in this manner.

The legal proceedings were initiated in the Hague district court by the Dutch Association of Defense Counsels, the Dutch Association of Journalists, the Internet Society Netherlands Chapter, the Privacy First Foundation and five private citizens.

The coalition wants to close a loophole through which the Dutch intelligence services can obtain data on Dutch citizens from foreign intelligence partners that it wouldn't have been able to acquire through legal means in the country.
(...)
The coalition's lawyers argue that mass data-collection programs like those of the NSA and the U.K. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) violate human rights guaranteed by international and European treaties including the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

As such, it was illegal in many countries, particularly in the European Union, to obtain data through those programs.

Civil society organizations and citizens in other European countries can and should launch similar legal actions, said Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm, a founding partner of Bureau Brandeis, the law firm that represents the Dutch coalition in this case."

Source: http://www.pcworld.com/article/2061581/dutch-civil-society-groups-sue-government-over-nsa-data-sharing.html, 6 November 2013.

"In Nederland heeft een groep burgers en organisaties een rechtszaak ingespannen tegen minister van Binnenlandse Zaken Roland Plasterk. De groep 'Burgers tegen Plasterk' eist dat de Nederlandse overheid geen informatie gebruikt die het via de Amerikaanse NSA heeft verkregen.

Burgers tegen Plasterk wil dat minister Plasterk verantwoording aflegt over het beleid van de Nederlandse overheid inzake het gebruik van NSA-gegevens. De geteisterde Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst zou illegaal informatie verzamelen over Nederlandse burgers, en die vervolgens doorspelen aan zijn Nederlandse tegenhanger AIVD.

Het initiatief komt onder meer van hacker Rop Gonggrijp en ICT-journalist Brenno De Winter. Ook de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Strafrechtadvocaten en de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Journalisten hebben zich aangesloten bij de rechtszaak, net als de Internet Society Nederland en de Stichting Privacy First.
(...)
De advocaat van de groep, Christaan Alberdingk Thijm, [stelt] dat Plasterk en de inlichtingendienst (...) illegaal verkregen data witwassen. 'Deze zaak moet daar een einde aan maken', aldus Alberdingk Thijm.

Minister Plasterk, die eerder al de Nederlandse inlichtingendienst verdedigde, is er van overtuigd dat de AIVD niets verkeerds doen en zich aan het wettelijk kader houdt. (...)"

Source: http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20131106_00826456, 6 November 2013.

By now basically everyone is aware of the far-reaching eavesdropping practices by the American National Security Agency (NSA). For years the NSA has been secretly eavesdropping on millions of people around the world, varying from ordinary citizens to journalists, politicians, attorneys, judges, scientists, CEOs, diplomats and even presidents and heads of State. In doing so, the NSA has completely ignored the territorial borders and laws of other countries, as we have learned from the revelations by Edward Snowden in the PRISM scandal. Instead of calling the Americans to order, secret services in other countries appear to be all too eager to make use of the intelligence that the NSA has unlawfully obtained. In this way national, European and international legislation that should safeguard citizens against such practices is being violated in two ways: on the one hand by foreign secret services such as the NSA that collect intelligence unlawfully, and on the other hand by secret services in other countries that subsequently use this intelligence. This constitutes an immediate threat to everyone’s privacy and to the proper functioning of every democratic constitutional State. This is also the case in the Netherlands, where neither the national Parliament nor the responsible minister (Mr. Ronald Plasterk, Home Affairs) has so far taken appropriate action. This situation cannot continue any longer. Therefore a national coalition of Dutch citizens and organizations (including the Privacy First Foundation) has today decided to take the Dutch government to court and demand that the inflow and use of illegal foreign intelligence on Dutch soil is instantly brought to a halt. Furthermore, the coalition demands that the Dutch government notifies all citizens whose personal data have been illegally obtained. These data must also be deleted.

These legal proceedings by the Privacy First Foundation primarily serve the general interest and aim to restore the right to privacy of every citizen in the Netherlands. The lawsuit is conducted by bureau Brandeis; this law firm also represents Privacy First and 19 co-plaintiffs (Dutch citizens) in our Passport Trial against the Dutch government. Privacy First is confident it will soon have positive outcomes in both of these cases.

Click HEREpdf to read the subpoena as it was presented to minister Plasterk today. (Dutch only)

Apart from Privacy First, the coalition of plaintiff parties consists of the following organizations and citizens:

- The Dutch Association of Defence Counsel (Nederlandse Vereniging van Strafrechtadvocaten, NVSA)
- The Dutch Association of Journalists (Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten, NVJ)
- The Dutch chapter of the Internet Society (ISOC.nl)
- Jeroen van Beek
- Rop Gonggrijp
- Bart Nooitgedagt (represented by the NVSA)
- Matthieu Paapst (represented by ISOC.nl)
- Brenno de Winter (represented by the NVJ).
 
Update 5 February 2014: today the Dutch government (Ministries of Home Affairs and Defence) has responded to the subpoena in a comprehensive statement of defence; click HEREpdf for the entire document (pdf; MIRROR) and HERE for the press release by our attorneys of bureau Brandeis (in Dutch). It is remarkable that the State Attorney only deems the Privacy First Foundation admissible (see p. 31). This means that Privacy First is only one step away from standing before the judges of the district court of The Hague. This development is also of great importance for our Passport Trial, in which that same court at an earlier stage deemed Privacy First et al. inadmissible. The Hague Court of Appeal is currently looking into this legal issue once more. In the point of view of Privacy First, the court should declare all plaintiffs (citizens and organizations) admissible in both the court case concerning the NSA as well as our lawsuit regarding the Dutch biometric passport.

Published in Litigation

Since we are a foundation that has privacy very high on its agenda, it is only natural for us to make use of a privacy-friendly hosting service for our website. Therefore the websites of Privacy First (privacyfirst.nl and privacyfirst.eu) are hosted on the servers of Greenhost in Amsterdam since this month. This decision was preceded by a thorough exploration of foreign alternatives, varying from hosting services inside a nuclear bunker in Sweden to VPN tunnels in Switzerland and an old fortress in the North Sea. However, Greenhost proved to be well ahead of its foreign competitors in terms of customer-friendliness, rapid response, sustainability and low costs for reliable and secure hosting, including Privacy by Design. Even the physical location is an advantage: Greenhost is situated in Amsterdam just a few hundred metres from the Privacy First office. Moreover, Greenhost has been a trustworthy partner of a number of NGOs, including Bits of Freedom. For Privacy First however, the decisive aspect was the fact that Greenhost has for years taken up an exemplary role of privacy pioneer, whereas many other ICT companies lagged behind in this respect. In 2009 Greenhost stopped logging email data and called for other companies to do the same. At the beginning of 2011 Greenhost wrote a manual for the security of internet traffic: the Basic Internet Security Manual. These initiatives not only reflect audacity and leadership, but also corporate social responsibility in the sense of privacy-friendly entrepreneurship. In that regard Greenhost and Privacy First have a shared vision on society. Therefore Privacy First looks forward with great confidence to the cooperation with Greenhost in the years to come!

Published in Online Privacy

At the end of this summer our colleagues from Bits of Freedom will once again be organizing the annual Big Brother Awards. Below are our nominations for the biggest Dutch privacy violations of the past year:

  1. Automatic Number Plate Recognition plans from Minister Opstelten
    If it’s up to the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice, Ivo Opstelten, the travels of every motorist in the Netherlands will soon be stored in a police database for four weeks through automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) for criminal investigation and prosecution purposes. This means that, in the view of Mr. Opstelten, every motorist is a potential criminal. Privacy First deems this proposal absolutely disproportional and therefore in breach with the right to privacy as stipulated under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In case Dutch Parliament accepts this legislative proposal, Privacy First will summon the Dutch State on account of unlawful legislation in violation with the right to privacy; see http://www.privacyfirst.eu/focus-areas/cctv/item/580-every-motorist-becomes-potential-suspect.html
  2. Proposal for hacking scheme from Minister Opstelten
    A second miserable plan from Minister Ivo Opstelten is to authorize the Dutch police force to hack into your computer and to oblige citizens to decrypt their encrypted files for the police. In the view of Privacy First this plan, too, is entirely in breach with the right to privacy, since it’s unnecessary and disproportional. Moreover, the proposal contravenes with the ban on self-incrimination (nemo tenetur). The proposal will lay the basis for future abuse of power and forms a typical building block for a police State instead of a democratic constitutional State. For our main objections, see http://www.privacyfirst.eu/focus-areas/law-and-politics/item/599-privacy-first-objections-against-opstelten-hacking-scheme.html.
  3. License plate parking
    As of late, in an ever greater number of Dutch cities (among which Amsterdam) license plate parking is becoming compulsory. Privacy First stands up for the classical right of citizens to travel freely and anonymously in their own country. The right to park anonymously is a part of this. License plate parking clearly disregards these rights. Moreover, it leads to function creep in breach with the right to privacy. The prime example here is the already proven abuse of parking information of lease drivers by the Dutch tax authorities; see http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/07/29/privacywaakhond-het-servicehuis-parkeren-overtreedt-de-wet/ (in Dutch).
  4. Highway section controls
    Section speed checks on Dutch highways make that the journeys of motorists are continuously being monitored. This forms a massive infringement of the right to privacy. Such an infringement requires a specific legal basis with guarantees against abuse. Moreover, function creep is just around the corner; this already becomes obvious from the current plans of Dutch Minister Opstelten to soon use all highway speed cameras for automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) for investigation and prosecution purposes of a whole range of criminal offences as well as the collection of outstanding fines, tax debts, etc.  
  5. Drones
    Besides the ‘usual’ cameras in neighbourhoods, shops, stations, above highways etc., citizens are increasingly – and almost unnoticed – being spied upon by flying cameras: so-called drones. The government does this (mainly the police) and so are private parties, yet without any sufficient legislation. Because of this the privacy risks and the likelihood of an accident are enormous. Privacy First therefore pleas for a moratorium on the use of drones until proper national legislation is put in place. Furthermore, drones should only be allowed to be used by the government in exceptional cases, for instance in disaster situations or for the investigation of suspects of very serious crimes, and only in case no other adequate means can be deployed. For private parties a license system is to be introduced with strict supervision and enforcement. Moreover, every drone is to be equipped with a transponder that is publically cognizable. 
  6. Police Taser weapons
    In September 2012 it became known that Dutch Minister Opstelten was planning to equip the entire Dutch police force with Taser weapons. In the view of Privacy First, the use of Taser weapons can easily lead to violations of the international ban on torture and the related right to physical integrity (which is part of the right to privacy). Taser weapons lower the threshold for police violence and hardly leave behind any external scars. At the same time they can inflict serious physical damage and mental harm. In conjunction with the current lack of firearms training for Dutch police officers, this produces serious risks for the Dutch population. In May 2013 the Dutch government had to justify itself over Opstelten’s plans in front of the UN Committee against Torture in Geneva; see http://www.privacyfirst.eu/focus-areas/law-and-politics/item/595-dutch-taser-weapons-on-agenda-of-un-committee-against-torture.html. Nevertheless, for the moment Opstelten’s intentions seem to be unchanged...
  7. Electronic Health Record
    In April 2011 the introduction of a Dutch national Electronic Health Record (Elektronisch Patiëntendossier, EPD) was unanimously binned by the Dutch Senate due to privacy objections and security risks. However, the national introduction of almost the same EPD was subsequently worked towards along a private route and this included the exchange of medical data through a National Switch Point (Landelijk Schakelpunt, LSP). This will by definition lead to 'function creep by design' instead of privacy by design. The digital ‘regional walls’ in and around the LSP will easily be circumvented or removed. Therefore the entire system can take on its old central form again at any given moment in the future, with all the privacy and security risks this entails. Furthermore, the current layout is characterized by generic instead of specific permission of the patient to share medical data with healthcare providers (and future third parties). This constitutes an imminent danger for the medical privacy of citizens as well as the professional confidentiality of medical specialists.
Published in Law & Politics

Earlier this year the Dutch Minister of Justice and Security Ivo Opstelten came up with the miserable plan to authorize the Dutch police force to hack into your computer (both at home and abroad!) and to enable the police to demand that you decrypt your encrypted files in the presence of a policeman and obediently hand them over to the State. In the context of an online consultation (in Dutch), Privacy First notified to the Minister that it has a number of principal objections against his plans:

Your Excellency,

The Privacy First Foundation hereby advises you to withdraw the legislative proposal ‘enforcement of the fight against cybercrime’ on the basis of the following eleven principal grounds:

  1. In our view, this legislative proposal forms a typical building block for a police State, not for a democratic constitutional State based on freedom and trust.
  2. The Netherlands has a general human rights duty to continuously fulfil the right to privacy instead of restricting it. With this legislative proposal the Netherlands violates this general duty.      
  3. This legislative proposal is not strictly necessary (contrary to possibly being ‘useful’ or 'handy') in a democratic society. Therefore the legislative proposal is in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
  4. Moreover, this legislative proposal violates the prohibition of self-incrimination (nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare).
  5. Function creep is a universal phenomenon. This will also apply to this legislative proposal, which will form the basis for future abuse of power.
  6. This legislative proposal puts the relationship of trust between the Dutch government and the Dutch people to the test. This will lead to a chilling effect in Dutch society.
  7. Through this legislative proposal age-old assets such as freedom of the press and the protection of journalistic sources, whistleblowers, freedom of speech, free information gathering, freedom of communication and the right to a fair trial are put under severe pressure. This is detrimental to the dynamics within a free democratic constitutional State.
  8. This legislative proposal and the accompanying technology will be imported and abused by less democratic governments abroad. Therefore the legislative proposal forms an international precedent for a worldwide Rule of the Jungle instead of the Rule of Law.
  9. As of yet the legislative proposal lacks a thorough and independent Privacy Impact Assessment.
  10. This legislative proposal stimulates suboptimal (i.e. crackable by the government, because otherwise illegal?) instead of optimal (‘uncrackable’) ICT security.
  11. Fighting cybercrime demands multilateral cooperation and coordination instead of unilateral panic-mongering as is the case with this legislative proposal.

Yours sincerely,

The Privacy First Foundation

Published in Law & Politics
Page 9 of 15

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