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These days, of all human rights the right to privacy finds itself under the most pressure. Therefore, it is of great importance that the government, being the largest privacy violator, is tightly controlled by means of proper legislation. With good checks & balances, for the government itself as well as for monitoring possible privacy violators such as Microsoft, Google, Apple and large ICT companies like Cisco and Intergraph that set up entire electronic surveillance infrastructures in China.

Under the ‘principle of security’, current Western democracies are increasingly being led by suspicion, hate and control instead of the principles of trust, love and freedom. And all of this to protect those last three mentioned? In the view of Privacy First, the line in the sand has already been drawn in 2001. Under the guise of security our legislation has been heavily modified to the disadvantage of individual citizens and through function creep the boundaries of the application of this legislation are continuously being stretched. Will loitering youth and football hooligans soon be seen as criminal or terrorist organisations under our judicial system? And what about everyone who thinks or acts differently? Where can we draw the line? And who makes the decisions over this? And who will scrutinize the decision maker and the executor?

At the moment, it is under the big heading of ‘profiling’ that ever more privacy violations take place. The aim of profiling is tracking entire populations or target groups in order to identify so-called 'outliers' through criteria and norms that are to be imposed. Outliers are deviations from the norm: people who behave differently than the ‘normal group’, or a specific group the government has set its eyes upon, whoever it may concern. People who have unpaid bills, who drive too fast, who gather in groups, attorneys, journalists, activists, airplane passengers, those entitled to public aid, sect members, etc. Just identify and track them, you never know if there’s someone amongst them who hasn’t abided by the rules or who fits a certain profile you’re looking for.

Profiling is characterised by four aspects that in our perception are in conflict with the Dutch Constitution as the basis for our constitutional State:

  • The reversion of a fundamental principle of law: citizens are tracked en masse without a concrete, reasonable suspicion of a crime. Through profiling everyone becomes a potential suspect and everyone’s privacy can be violated unpunished.
  • With the current state of technology, profiling is aimed at continuous, real-time identification instead of passive registration and analysis of data of a citizen under reasonable suspicion. So we move from registration to identification, without the authorization and awareness of the trustful citizen. In this way, out of its own distrust the government abuses the good faith of citizens and in so doing imposes its own standard criteria. Without any democratic evaluation or strict legal guarantees.
  • The application of the technology used for profiling is based on the principle that ‘everything’s allowed if it’s technically possible’. For the greater part this development is invisible for citizens. Subway stations, trains, busses, trams, inner cities, police helmets and even parking machines (!) in Amsterdam are incessantly being equipped with cameras. These are linked to central control rooms and, where possible, fitted with identification and pattern recognition software in order to be able to directly perceive ‘suspicious matters’. The mantra of our government: ‘ill doers are ill deemers’.
  • Increasing restrictions to internet freedom of companies and individuals. Since 2010 all our personal telephone and email correspondence are being stored. All this is being done to prepare for profiling. At the moment the US Congress is working on a legislative proposal (Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, CISPA) which grants private businesses and the US government the right to spy on citizens at any given moment and for as long as they want and to report them in case there are ‘outliers’. All of this without the need for a warrant. WikiLeaks, child porn, copying illegal content and the like are all too readily used to introduce new legislation to further restrict our internet freedom and which is to be applied in other areas the government wants to have control over. Preferably on a worldwide scale, without any democratic scrutiny. The government obliges citizens to increasingly use online services: the Citizen ‘Service’ (Control that is) Number (in Dutch: Burger Service Nummer, BSN), the Electronic Child File (Elektronisch Kind Dossier, EKD/DDJGZ), the Electronic Student File (Elektronisch Leerlingen Dossier, ELD), Diagnosis Treatment Combinations in healthcare (Diagnose Behandel Combinaties, DBC’s), etc. Of every citizen an ‘electronic life file’ comes into existence which in conjunction with electronic traces are to become able to predict suspect or deviant behaviour. Preferably in real-time and online. All of this, naturally, to protect our freedom...

In case fingerprints in passports will be replaced by new biometric features, the road will be cleared for a much worse form of profiling. Through the use of facial scans in databases, citizens will be able to be identified and tracked in public spaces in real-time and to be singled out through profiling on the basis of criteria predetermined by ‘someone’. In this process the government deliberately focuses on modifying the technology. As a result, there is 'fortunately' no need to talk about whether or not biometrics are actually desirable in our society, and if so, under which conditions and guarantees. Privacy First advocates for 'privacy by design' and privacy enhanced technologies as well as strict legislation with regard to biometrics and profiling. Because we don’t want to leave our children behind in an electronic concentration camp...

For a free, open and vivid 2012!

Bas Filippini,
Chairman of the Privacy First Foundation

Postscript: in the context of the National Privacy Debate, this column has also been published (in Dutch) as an Opinion by Dutch web-magazine Webwereld: http://webwereld.nl/opinie/110383/profiling-het-grootste-gevaar-voor-privacy--opinie-.html and http://nationaalprivacydebat.nl/article/ww/110383/profiling-het-grootste-gevaar-voor-privacy-opinie

Published in Columns

Since a few days there is justified commotion over two new Dutch government plans that will grossly invade people's privacy. The first one is a plan by Dutch Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Affairs Gerd Leers of the Christian-democratic party CDA to start creating automatic risk profiles of every airplane passenger. Before going on a business trip or on vacation, you will get a little green, yellow, orange or red flag behind your name. Without you knowing it. This is no hint at a surprise party, no, it’s because in the eyes of the Dutch government you may be a dangerous terrorist. At Schiphol Airport you are hopefully amongst those who can quickly go passed the security checks for people with green flags. In case you have a different flag you’ll be taken apart, thoroughly checked and interrogated and as a consequence you might miss your flight. The legislative proposal hasn’t yet been sent to the Dutch House of Representatives, but the government is already starting to build the corresponding central infrastructure (PARDEX). This is the state of democracy in the Netherlands in 2012.

The second plan has been concocted by Dutch State Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment Paul de Krom of the liberal party VVD. In terms of protection of privacy, De Krom happens to be just as uncompromising: his idea is to create comprehensive profiles of everyone entitled to social welfare from now on, on the basis of all the possible databases that can be linked to the municipal population register. In case an anomaly is found in your digital profile, you immediately appear on the radar of a central control room, a sort of Central Command for public benefits. Subsequently, it’s up to you to prove something’s not right with your profile, otherwise you may lose your benefit.  

Both proposals are all about profiling: creating and keeping up-to-date detailed risk profiles of ordinary citizens. In an ocean of information that for 99% derives from innocent people, Leers and De Krom are hoping to catch that 1% of (potential) troublemakers. (Do you remember 'The One Percent Doctrineby Dick Cheney?) In other words, it’s an inversion of the classic principle that the government is only allowed to intrude upon your privacy once there’s a reasonable suspicion of a crime. After all, through profiling everyone is treated as a (potential) suspect beforehand. This effectively turns the right to privacy into fiction.

Yesterday night this topic was discussed on Dutch radio programme Dichtbij Nederland (‘Close to the Netherlands’) on NTR, Radio 5. Apart from Vincent Böhre of Privacy First, two experts took part in the debate: criminologist Marianne van den Anker (former municipal councillor of the regional political party Leefbaar (‘Livable’) Rotterdam, dealing with security) and Marc Jacobs (writer and former police commissioner). The whole discussion can be listened to HERE (starting at 17m48s).

Published in Profiling

Step 1: E-Gates at Schiphol Airport

Today a seemingly innocent article in Computable caught Privacy First’s attention. The title of the article is ‘‘Passport photo system is fraud sensitive’’ and its subtitle reads ‘‘Digital passport photo inadequate’’. The gist of the article is that the quality of the facial scans in passports (and ID cards) will have to be improved in order for the chance of mismatches in automated facial recognition at Schiphol Airport to be reduced. An experiment with facial recognition is currently planned for the fall of 2011. At Schiphol 36 so-called E-Gates will then be installed: gates for automatic border passage.    

On your way to the gate you will simply walk through one of those gates: the System verifies whether your face corresponds with the face on the chip of your passport. In case the System works 100% a 100% of the time then it’s enormously useful. In case it doesn’t, the System causes delays and irritation, long queues and new opportunities for identity fraud. And even if it does work faultlessly, there’s still a hidden 'catch': automatic screening of your security profile. Before coming to Schiphol you have already been completely screened on the basis of all possible databases that have been linked to you. Once at Schiphol it’s 'party time': without you knowing it your name has been assigned to a green, yellow, orange or red flag. More colors are possible. All of this remains unknown to you, which makes it all the more exciting. If you are taken apart from the queue at the E-Gate then it won’t be for a cup of tea and a biscuit, but to admire the color of your virtual flag once more. After all, it’s party time and the Royal Netherlands Border Police would rather not be color-blind. With a bit of luck you can still go aboard your plane, hoping of course that at the arrival in country X there’s no other feast of flags awaiting you.

Step 2: passport photo booth in the city hall

A few years later (on your return to the Netherlands) you need to renew your passport. For new passport photos you go to your local professional photographer. However, he redirects you to the city hall. For some time passports photos are still only allowed to be made there. You vaguely recall an article in Computable that already referred to this: ‘‘Mistakes [with passport photos] could be prevented by making a digital photo of the passport applicants in the city hall, at the moment they make their passport application.’’ At the time (2011) this seemed enormously useful to the government. Henceforth no more hassle with professional photographers but high definition 3D photos taken straight away in a special Big Brother booth at the town hall, easy as that. Designed initially for E-Gates at Schiphol, then used for automatic facial recognition in shops and on the streets, eventually worldwide. A comparable Dutch plan was rejected in 2007 under pressure from the sector of professional photographers. Since that time our country was hit by one recession after the other. Meanwhile the Dutch privacy movement flourished. But that wasn't meant to spoil the 'fun'. Therefore it took the Dutch government a lot of effort to convince photographers that they could very well do without their passport photo revenues. Not to mention the privacy of Dutch citizens.

Will this be our future? Not if it’s up to Privacy First. We’ll keep you posted.

Published in Profiling
Wednesday, 20 October 2010 14:51

Building the Big Brother networks

The meters, grids and networks for a Big Brother society are not developed or placed by one organisation.

It is the economic impetus that inadvertently builds all the ingredients needed for a centrally controlled electronic society.

Here is an example of the way the thought processes run. When found, more will be added.

It is good practice to know the way the winds blow and heed them.

As soon as someone says you should give up your right to self-determination ‘‘for your own good’’, all alarm bells should set off.

‘‘We are here for your own good’’, ‘‘we work for your security’’ and all that jazz, and then they immediately entirely wipe out YOUR privacy. Now that’s the primary distinguishing mark of Big Brother.

Within the European Union there’s a research program called the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) which receives € 51 billion of funding.

It’s a beautiful research program of which pro-privacy programs such as PrimeLife are a part.

However, the EU is just as well working on Big Brother-like grids such as INDECT, a surveillance system for all online traffic. Now even the European Parliament has noted that something is going on.

In November 2010 it was found out, through insufficiently censored documents that the Dutch Ministry of the Interior had released, that apart from telephone data Dutch judicial authorities now also want to cluster and examine all bank details of citizens, on the same principle that was already used for telephone data tapping. Click HERE for more information about this.    

The essence of the objections against Big Brother-like practices is that citizens are forced to completely adapt to certain standards that are being imposed on them by strangers – who don’t impose those standards on themselves! These standards are then evaluated on the basis of vague criteria in order for everyone to no longer be able to be him or herself. Instead, everyone has to fit into a mould determined by the authorities. Take, for example, Mao’s reign of terror with his Little Red Book, the Cultural Revolution and the Mao uniform. Or think of the film Das Leben der Anderen. In that way rulers are instantly able to see who’s trying to escape their rulership. There are other people who outline this in more politically correct terms. See this article in The Telegraph of 19 September 2009: ‘‘EU funding ‘Orwellian’ artificial intelligence plan to monitor public for "abnormal behaviour’’. Download a pdf-version of the article pdfhere.
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Published in Profiling

Argumentation courtesy of Stichting Meldpunt Misbruik Identificatieplicht ('Dutch Contact Point on Abuse of Mandatory Identification'):

(1) The application of a Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID)-chip makes the 'OV-chipkaart' (Public Transport chip card) vulnerable. Information on the card can be read by others at a distance, the card can be copied or manipulated, and the credit that’s on it can easily be stolen.

(2) Storing personal data for much too long affects people's personal freedom. There is absolutely no need for transport companies to continuously register exactly where someone is located, to make video images of every check-in and check-out and to store these data for an undetermined period of time.

(3) Because personalized chip cards are to be accommodated with a scan of the passport photo, cameras located at every public transport turnstile can be programmed in such a way that certain people or certain groups of people can be singled out. Associated law enforcement or commercial applications invade people's privacy. By means of the new system, public transport companies become an extension of police and law enforcement authorities and can earn money by commercially making use of personal information for marketing or advertisement purposes.

(4) Privacy will have to be paid for. Everyone who doesn’t want his travel behavior being documented or his passport being scanned and digitally saved in the administration of the transport company will be excluded by the system from subscription and will be financially disadvantaged in case he/she wants to protect his/her privacy. In this way, public transport companies that have the task to provide proper transport will start earning money from the privacy of their clients.

Published in Mobility
Friday, 08 October 2010 22:17

The Fair Information Principles

The general philosophy of the Fair Information Principles

1. Notice/Awareness

The most fundamental principle is notice. Consumers should be given notice of an entity's information practices before any personal information is collected from them. Without notice, a consumer cannot make an informed decision as to whether and to what extent to disclose personal information. Moreover, three of the other principles discussed below -- choice/consent, access/participation, and enforcement/redress -- are only meaningful when a consumer has notice of an entity's policies, and his or her rights with respect thereto.

While the scope and content of notice will depend on the entity's substantive information practices, notice of some or all of the following have been recognized as essential to ensuring that consumers are properly informed before divulging personal information:

  • identification of the entity collecting the data;
  • identification of the uses to which the data will be put;
  • identification of any potential recipients of the data;
  • the nature of the data collected and the means by which it is collected if not obvious (passively, by means of electronic monitoring, or actively, by asking the consumer to provide the information);
  • whether the provision of the requested data is voluntary or required, and the consequences of a refusal to provide the requested information; and
  • the steps taken by the data collector to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and quality of the data.

Some information practice codes state that the notice should also identify any available consumer rights, including: any choice respecting the use of the data; whether the consumer has been given a right of access to the data; the ability of the consumer to contest inaccuracies; the availability of redress for violations of the practice code; and how such rights can be exercised.

In the Internet context, notice can be accomplished easily by the posting of an information practice disclosure describing an entity's information practices on a company's site on the Web. To be effective, such a disclosure should be clear and conspicuous, posted in a prominent location, and readily accessible from both the site's home page and any Web page where information is collected from the consumer. It should also be unavoidable and understandable so that it gives consumers meaningful and effective notice of what will happen to the personal information they are asked to divulge.

2. Choice/Consent

The second widely-accepted core principle of fair information practice is consumer choice or consent. At its simplest, choice means giving consumers options as to how any personal information collected from them may be used. Specifically, choice relates to secondary uses of information -- i.e., uses beyond those necessary to complete the contemplated transaction. Such secondary uses can be internal, such as placing the consumer on the collecting company's mailing list in order to market additional products or promotions, or external, such as the transfer of information to third parties.

Traditionally, two types of choice/consent regimes have been considered: opt-in or opt-out. Opt-in regimes require affirmative steps by the consumer to allow the collection and/or use of information; opt-out regimes require affirmative steps to prevent the collection and/or use of such information. The distinction lies in the default rule when no affirmative steps are taken by the consumer. Choice can also involve more than a binary yes/no option. Entities can, and do, allow consumers to tailor the nature of the information they reveal and the uses to which it will be put. Thus, for example, consumers can be provided separate choices as to whether they wish to be on a company's general internal mailing list or a marketing list sold to third parties. In order to be effective, any choice regime should provide a simple and easily-accessible way for consumers to exercise their choice.

In the online environment, choice easily can be exercised by simply clicking a box on the computer screen that indicates a user's decision with respect to the use and/or dissemination of the information being collected. The online environment also presents new possibilities to move beyond the opt-in/opt-out paradigm. For example, consumers could be required to specify their preferences regarding information use before entering a Web site, thus effectively eliminating any need for default rules.

3. Access/Participation

Access is the third core principle. It refers to an individual's ability both to access data about him or herself -- i.e., to view the data in an entity's files -- and to contest that data's accuracy and completeness. Both are essential to ensuring that data are accurate and complete. To be meaningful, access must encompass timely and inexpensive access to data, a simple means for contesting inaccurate or incomplete data, a mechanism by which the data collector can verify the information, and the means by which corrections and/or consumer objections can be added to the data file and sent to all data recipients.

4. Integrity/Security

The fourth widely accepted principle is that data be accurate and secure. To assure data integrity, collectors must take reasonable steps, such as using only reputable sources of data and cross-referencing data against multiple sources, providing consumer access to data, and destroying untimely data or converting it to anonymous form.

Security involves both managerial and technical measures to protect against loss and the unauthorized access, destruction, use, or disclosure of the data. Managerial measures include internal organizational measures that limit access to data and ensure that those individuals with access do not utilize the data for unauthorized purposes. Technical security measures to prevent unauthorized access include encryption in the transmission and storage of data; limits on access through use of passwords; and the storage of data on secure servers or computers that are inaccessible by modem.

5. Enforcement/Redress

It is generally agreed that the core principles of privacy protection can only be effective if there is a mechanism in place to enforce them. Absent an enforcement and redress mechanism, a fair information practice code is merely suggestive rather than prescriptive, and does not ensure compliance with core fair information practice principles.



The Fair Information Principles as put into Canadian Law

Klik hier voor de bron.

These principles are usually referred to as “fair information principles”.

They are included in the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), Canada’s private-sector privacy law, and called "Privacy Principles".

Privacy Principles

Principle 1 — Accountability

An organization is responsible for personal information under its control and shall designate an individual or individuals who are accountable for the organization’s compliance with the following principles.

Principle 2 — Identifying Purposes

The purposes for which personal information is collected shall be identified by the organization at or before the time the information is collected.

Principle 3 — Consent

The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate.

Principle 4 — Limiting Collection

The collection of personal information shall be limited to that which is necessary for the purposes identified by the organization. Information shall be collected by fair and lawful means.

Principle 5 — Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention

Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which it was collected, except with the consent of the individual or as required by law. Personal information shall be retained only as long as necessary for the fulfilment of those purposes.

Principle 6 — Accuracy

Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used.

Principle 7 — Safeguards

Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information.

Principle 8 — Openness

An organization shall make readily available to individuals specific information about its policies and practices relating to the management of personal information.

Principle 9 — Individual Access

Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the existence, use, and disclosure of his or her personal information and shall be given access to that information. An individual shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the information and have it amended as appropriate.

Principle 10 — Challenging Compliance

An individual shall be able to address a challenge concerning compliance with the above principles to the designated individual or individuals accountable for the organization’s compliance.


Published in Philosophy
Page 2 of 2

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